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Then Almitra spoke again and said,
And what of Marriage, Master?
And he answered saying:
You were born together, and together
you shall be forevermore.
You shall be together when the white
wings of death scatter your days.
Ay, you shall be together even in the
silent memory of God.
But let there be spaces in your together-
ness,
And let the winds of the heavens dance
between you.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of space limitations, family law cases whose primary em-
phasis was in other fields of law will be discussed in the contracts, torts,
property and trusts articles in this Survey. Legislation enacted during the
1963 general session of the Legislature will be discussed in the appropriate
sections of this article.
The Supreme Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal have
decided numerous cases of first impression dealing with almost every
facet of family law. In the main, these first impression cases would ap-
pear to be welcome additions to the law. Unfortunately, the courts seem
to have had difficulties with the more commonplace areas of the law.
The district courts have been especially prone to overlook what their
sister courts have decided or to overlook their own recent decisions. These
faults probably can be attributed, in part, to the inadequate research
of the lawyers involved in these cases, as well as to the fact that the case
load of the district courts (as well as the supreme court) has reached
an alarming level.' However, it is submitted that part of this case load
*** GIBRAN, THE PROPHET 19 (1923). See Bodenheimer, The Utah Marriage Counseling
Experiment: An Account oj Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure, 7 UTAH L. REV. 443
(1961).
1. The following figures reflect the case load for the supreme court and the district courts
of appeal during the year 1962:
SuPREM COURT: 281 cases were on the docket at the beginning of the year and
895 were filed during the year. 153 petitions for rehearing were
filed. The court decided 911 cases and disposed of 187 petitions
for rehearing.
DISTRICT COURTS:
First District: 232 cases were on the docket at the beginning of the year and
399 cases were filed during the year. 144 petitions for rehearing were filed.
The court decided 431 cases and disposed of 129 petitions for rehearing.
Second District: 486 cases were on the docket at the beginning of the year and
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has been caused by the fine distinctions and endless subtleties articulated
by these courts which serve to confuse rather than clarify. The whole
subject of family law is badly in need of a comprehensive legislative over-
haul, or, at the very least, a "restatement" prepared by experts which
would be respected by the courts.
II. MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
Three cases illustrate the complex questions of presumptions and
burden of proof when the parties have contracted second marriages with-
out possessing record evidence of the dissolution of the first marriage. One
action was brought to establish the existence of a common law marriage
which grew out of a mutually known meretricious relationship of the
parties, who were both married to other spouses. It was held that the
plaintiff "has the burden of proving by competent and convincing evi-
dence the dissolution of the previous marriages of both parties prior to
the date of the alleged common law marriage."2 This requirement is
based upon the concept that a marriage is not being attacked, but rather
it is an attempt to establish the marriage. The usual prima facie presump-
tion favoring the second marriage does not govern a case involving a
relationship which "originated in conscious meretriciousness." ' This situa-
tion should be compared with one involving a ceremonial marriage which
was preceded by an allegedly undissolved common law marriage. In this
latter situation, the usual rule that a subsequent marriage is presumed
valid can only be rebutted by showing the existence of an undissolved
common law marriage and this latter fact must be shown by clear proof
that the relationship, which had been illicit in its inception, had been
transformed into a valid common law marriage. A relationship which is
meretricious in its inception is presumed to continue in that state unless
clear and convincing evidence is shown that the relationship has been
transformed into a valid common law marriage. Proof of this common
law marriage and its undissolved status is necessary in order to overcome
the presumptive validity of a second marriage; in effect, the person al-
leging the invalidity of the second marriage has to overcome two presump-
tions.'
In the second appellate appearance of King v. Keller,5 a workmen's
795 cases were filed during the year. 201 petitions for rehearing were filed.
The court decided 768 cases and disposed of 224 petitions for rehearing.
Third District: 549 cases were on the docket at the beginning of the year
and 791 cases were filed during the year. 299 petitions for rehearing were
filed. The court decided 891 cases and disposed of 297 petitions for
rehearing.
Eighth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of Florida 14-16 (June 30, 1963).
2. Board of Trustees of Fireman's Relief & Pension Fund v. Daffron, 134 So.2d 522,
525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). (Emphasis by court.) See Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1963).
3. Board of Trustees of Fireman's Relief & Pension Fund v. Daffron, 134 So.2d 522,
525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
4. In re Hind's Estate, 135 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
S. King v. Keller, 141 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1962); King v. Keller, 117 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1960).
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compensation case, the first wife was successful in overcoming the pre-
sumption of the validity of the second marriage. She introduced certifi-
cates from the Bureaus of Vital Statistics (or similar agencies) of forty-
two states which indicated that there was no record evidence of any
divorce between her and her husband. In addition, she submitted letters
to the same effect from approximately one hundred and fifty counties in
states where her husband was known to have traveled, and these were
admissible in the workmen's compensation hearing even though many of
these letters did not bear the seals of the offices writing the letters.
A. Common Law and Plural Marriages
The Florida statute governing the widow's allowance6 does not pro-
vide for a jury trial to determine if the alleged spouse is the common law
widow of the deceased. Therefore, a petition under this statute does not
constitute a waiver of her right to a jury trial in a later petition for the
assignment of dower.' Further, a decision by the county judge that she
is not the common law widow in a widow's allowance proceedings is not
res judicata as to her subsequent petition for an assignment of dower.8
Of course, any testimony by the alleged widow as to any agreement and
consent by the deceased to marry her is prohibited by the Dead Man's
Statute.9
B. Legislation
Under an amendment to the Florida statutes10 it would appear that
a county judge may now, in his discretion, issue a marriage license to any
male or female (with or without their parent's consent) under the age
of twenty-one if they both swear that they are parents or expectant
parents.
C. Annulment
The Florida statute which provides that a divorce may be granted
when "either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the mar-
riage sought to be annulled" has been construed to mean that an annul-
ment or divorce may be granted "only to an innocent party who entered
the relationship believing that the other party was capable of assuming
the marital bonds."" Therefore, a divorce or annulment will be denied
to a party who entered into a "marital" relationship while knowing that
the other party was married to another. It is submitted that this decision
Since the husband deserted the first wife and she was not to blame for the separation, she
was entitled to support and was legally dependent upon him within the definition of the
term "widow" in the workmen's compensation law. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(15) (1961).
6. FLA. STAT. § 733.20(1) (1963).
7. FLA. STAT. § 733.12(3) (1963).
8. Levine v. Feuer, 152 So.2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
9. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1963). See Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
10. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-238, amending FLA. STAT. § 741.06 (1961).
11. Higgins v. Higgins, 146 So.2d 122, 123 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), construing FLA. STAT.
§ 65.04(9) (1961).
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is regretable. All the court has succeeded in doing is to refuse to make
it a matter of record that the parties are not married with the result that
the "records" indicate a marriage which the law says is void. It would
seem that "guilt" or "innocence" should be irrelevant when the court is
dealing with a void marriage.' 2
III. JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE
A. Residence
In the first square holding on this point in Florida, a district court
has held that a long-time resident may leave his family in Florida, move
to New York, continue to support his family in Florida and still maintain
his Florida residence or domicile for purposes of securing a divorce four
months after establishing his "dwelling place" in New York. The proof
of Florida residence was supported by the fact that the husband main-
tained that he intended to retain his Florida residence and that he was
an airline pilot flying between New York and Miami." In a similar vein,
the factually incomplete case of Jeffries v. Jeffries14 seemingly held that
a native Floridian who never resided out of Florida except during the
period of his military service was a "resident" for purposes of jurisdiction
under the divorce laws. The opinion seems to imply that this Floridian
had not actually physically resided in Florida for the six month period
preceding the filing of the complaint; however, his original status as a
resident would be presumed to continue until it was proved that he had
relinquished his Florida residence and established a new residence in
some other state. On the other hand it has been held that even though a
serviceman had adopted Florida as his permanent domicile, he had not
resided in Florida for the requisite six months period and the court would
not have jurisdiction to grant a divorce. 5
As a result of these cases it would appear that physical presence is
unnecessary for "residents" who have not acquired another domicile in
another state. This concept seems to conflict with the holding of Brown
v. Brown,'6 which drew a distinction between domicile and residence, but
it is in accord with McIntyre v. McIntyre."'
A mere adjudication of mental incompetency by a court of another
12. This decision appears to be an adoption of the minority "clean hands" rule. See
KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 225 (Moreland, editor 3d ed: 1946); 3 NELSON, DIVORCE
AND ANNULMENT §§ 31.14 & 31.15 (2d ed. 1945); I VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
§ 51 (1931).
13. Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 326, 327 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
14. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 133 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
15. Hostler v. Hostler, 151 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). At the time of this suit,
the serviceman was serving as United States air attach6 for Lebanon, Jordan and Cyprus
and was residing in the Middle East.
16. Brown v. Brown, 123 So.2d 382 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960); noted in 15 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 409 (1961).
17. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 53 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1951).
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state and commitment to a state mental hospital does not prevent a
person from acquiring a new domicile in Florida sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction of a suit for divorce. If the person has sufficient mental
capacity to elect a new domicile he has sufficient legal capacity in the
absence of any objection by the guardian. The Florida court will make
its own factual determination of the person's capacity to change his
domicile, and it will not be bound by the prior determination of a sister
state. 18
B. Jurisdiction of the Parties
In a case of first impression in Florida,19 a district court has held
that a husband may not file a counterclaim for divorce when the wife has
instituted support proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Law in effect in Ohio20 and Florida.2 1 The decision is
based squarely upon the provisions of section 88.291 of the Florida
Statutes, which provide that "[p]articipation in any proceedings under
this chapter shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the
parties thereto in any other proceeding. 22
IV. VACATING OF DECREES
A summary judgment may be entered in favor of a husband when
there is no real basis in fact for the wife's complaint in the nature of a
bill of review attacking those portions of a divorce decree dealing with
child custody, a lump sum settlement and an interest in real property.2 8
Laches is an affirmative defense which must be raised in the answer and
not in a motion to dismiss; 24 however, it has been held that when laches
appears from the face of the complaint it may be reached by a motion to
dismiss.2 5 This latter exception would not, however, be applicable to a
complaint which was filed in December, 1960, attacking a divorce decree
entered in February, 1958, in the absence of any facts alleged in the com-
plaint in addition to the time interval; the time interval alone is insuf-
ficient to justify the imposition of laches by means of a motion to dis-
miss. 2 6
In Martz v. Riskamm"7 a district court of appeal sustained the decree
of a chancellor setting aside a divorce decree for fraud. The divorce was
18. Matthews v. Matthews, 141 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). Of course, if the person
is in fact mentally incompetent he will not be able to change his domicile.
19. Blois v. Blois, 138 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
20. Laws of Ohio, §§ 3115.01-3115.22 (1963).
21. FLA. STAT. ch. 88 (1961).
22. FLA. STAT. § 88.291 (1961).
23. Smith v. Bollinger, 137 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
24. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
25. Flye v. Jeffords, 106 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958).
26. Volpicella v. Volpicella, 136 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The court also ruled
that it is an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to deny leave to amend a complaint unless
it is clear that the complaint cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action.
27. 144 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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granted in 1945, based upon the husband's affidavit (for constructive
service) that he did not know the residence of his wife when in fact he
did know it, and when his fraud was aided and abetted by his mistress
who was his sole corroborating witness and who later married him. It is
interesting to note that this attack was made subsequent to the husband's
death. This case should be compared with Grammer v. Grammer,2"
which involved a second wife who was innocent of any connection with
the fraud practiced in the divorce of her husband from his first wife.
V. DIVORCE
A. Pleading
The third district court of appeal has expressly adopted the minority
rule in the United States which allows a party to a divorce proceeding to
file a supplemental pleading charging the other party with a new ground
for divorce committed after the institution of the suit and the filing of
the complaint.29 This decision is predicated upon the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure which provide for counterclaims maturing or acquired
after pleading, supplemental pleadings and amendments generally.80
B. Cruelty
Letters written by a husband to his wife's attorneys after the in-
stitution of divorce proceedings may be used to corroborate the wife's
testimony as to the husband's cruel treatment during the marriage. More-
over, the filing of unfounded charges by the husband during the course of
the litigation as to alleged adultery by the wife will constitute cruelty.8
C. Desertion
The filing of a separate maintenance action by a wife will not neces-
sarily toll the running of the time required to sustain a husband's charge
of desertion; the lack of a genuine basis for the separate maintenance
action or the fact that the wife has refused an unconditional offer of re-
conciliation by the husband will preclude the suit from tolling the running
of the desertion period. 2
D. Defenses
The defenses of condonation and comparative rectitude vis a vis
recrimination were further confused by the courts. Seiferth v. Seiferth8"
held that continued cohabitation and sexual intercourse which occurred
28. 80 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1955).
29. Scherer v. Scherer, 150 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
30. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13, 1.15(d), 1.15(e).
31. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1961). For a case that comes "danger-
ously" close to allowing divorces by consent, see Voll v. Voll, 153 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1963).
32. Smith v. Smith, 148 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1963) (dictum).
33. 132 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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after the hearings in a divorce case had been concluded and after the
master filed his report would not per se constitute a condonation in the
absence of proof that the wife had in fact forgiven the husband for his
cruel conduct. Pearson, J., dissenting, was of the view that sexual inter-
course under these circumstances was condonation as a matter of law.
If this decision remains unchallenged, the defense of condonation has
ceased to exist.
It would appear that the case of Bennett v. Bennett34 has approved
(at least indirectly) the concept of comparative rectitude. The chancellor
found that the "evidence adduced heretofore sustains the allegations of
cruelty upon the part of the parties hereto each to the other.""5 He then
entered a divorce decree which failed to indicate which party was granted
the divorce. The district court reversed and directed the chancellor to
"determine in whose favor the equities exist and to enter a decree of
divorce accordingly. '3 6 Although the label comparative rectitude was not
used, the concept was. On the other hand the case of Carlson v. Carlson7
held that when there was sufficient evidence that both parties were guilty
of extreme cruelty the chancellor would be justified in denying a divorce
to either party under the doctrine of recrimination.
E. Decrees
When one of the parties to a divorce suit dies, the chancellor has no
power to enter a divorce decree nunc pro tunc as of the date he orally
articulated his findings of fact and his view of the equities of the case;
oral pronouncements of the chancellor are not the equivalent of a written
final decree.8
A final decree of divorce reserving jurisdiction "to resolve issues be-
tween the adult parties litigant"3 9 is too broad. The decree should specify
that jurisdiction is reserved with reference to support and alimony for
the wife, or as to the care, support and custody of children, or for the
purpose of enforcing compliance with the terms of the final decree, or
with respect to all of the foregoing matters. Nevertheless, under a decree
which provides that the court retains "jurisdiction herein for the entry
of such other and further orders as may be proper herein, and for the
purpose of modifying any orders herein"40 it would be improper for the
court to modify provisions of the original decree which dealt with prop-
34. 132 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. 144 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). For the defense of collusion, which was not
dealt with by the Florida courts, see Bradway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law
of Divorce, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 374 (1962).
38. McKendree v. McKendree, 139 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); compare Berken-
field v. Jacobs, 83 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1955).
39. Durden v. Durden, 137 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
40. McEachin v. McEachin, 154 So.2d 894, 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
FAMILY LAW
erty rights because the original decree had become final, although it would
be proper to modify the custody provisions of the original decree.
It is error for a chancellor to award a divorce to both parties4' or to
modify a final decree of divorce which has become final and upon which
no petition for rehearing was pending.42
F. Appeals
A wife who has accepted all of the benefits accruing to her under a
final decree of divorce in accordance with the agreement which she made
with her husband during the pendency of the proceedings is estopped to
attack the validity of the divorce itself. The amendment to the Florida
Appellate Rules48 which permits a wife to request the lower court to
order the payment of support and alimony pending an appeal without
waiving her right to contest the decree is not applicable when the wife
accepts the benefits of a final decree.44
G. Legislation
A Florida statute was amended 45 to provide for an additional charge
of one dollar for the preparation and execution of "proof of publication
or publisher's affidavit" for all counties having a population in excess of
450,000 inhabitants.
VI. ALIMONY
A. Right to Alimony
The obligation to pay alimony arises out of and is a continuation of
the husband's duty of support during the marriage. Hence, it is reversible
error for a chancellor to award a weekly sum payable in 520 weeks in
order to compensate the wife for money which she advanced to her hus-
band during the marriage and for what she "might otherwise have ac-
cumulated out of her earnings from 1946 to 1956 if she had not been
under some degree of necessity to use such earnings to discharge the
obligations of the husband to support and educate his family. ' 4 A wife
41. Mosca v. Mosca, 144 So.2d 80 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (dicta).
42. Goff v. Goff, 151 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
43. FLA. R. APP. P. 3.8(b).
44. Carter v. Carter, 141 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). See also Hadley v. Hadley,
140 So.2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), note 60 infra. When a chancellor awards to a former
wife a sum which is equivalent to one-half of the value of improvements which she made
in the home property jointly owned by her and her former husband, it is considered as a
final decree in that it is a final adjudication of her claim for contribution from the former
husband of her share of the improvements in the property. As a result, the former husband
may appeal from the decree under Rule 3 of the Florida Appellate Rules (which provides
for appeals from final decrees) or under Rule 4.2 which permits appeals from decrees
entered subsequent to a final decree. In effect, a case may have a number of "final" decrees.
Shannon v. Shannon, 136 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
45. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-49.
46. Spears v. Spears, 148 So.2d 564, 566, 567 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). The case was re-
19631
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will have no standing to ask for alimony in the future when the final
divorce decree fails to provide for alimony and the decree fails to retain
jurisdiction. 7
B. Criteria for the Award
The fact that a husband has vilified his wife's attorneys and has
instigated a campaign of postcard and letter writing "obviously intended
to intimidate"48 the Florida Supreme Court should not be considered in
determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to the wife. The
award should be based upon the husband's ability to pay and not upon
a conscious or subconscious basis of awarding punitive damages.
The fact that the wife's conduct has been "extremely reprehensible" 9
may be taken into account in determining whether alimony will be
awarded and the amount thereof; "[a] wife from whom the husband
obtains a divorce because of her misconduct ordinarily is denied alimony
eo nomine, but allowances have been made in exceptional cases."50
It is error for a chancellor to order a husband to pay all of his
former wife's medical bills in excess of fifty dollars per year because "it
is not a continuing obligation of a former husband to pay a former wife's
medical expenses ad infinitum and without any attempt to determine a
maximum liability on his part."'" With all due respect to the court, if
alimony is a continuation of the husband's duty of support, it appears
that the court has made some esoteric distinction between support for
food and shelter and medical expenses. If the court meant that the hus-
band should not be liable for useless or frivolous medical treatment, then
the decision seems sound; if the court meant that the husband is not
liable for bona fide medical expenses, then the husband's duty of support
is much less than if the marriage had been preserved.
The fact that a divorced husband is living with his parents and is not
required to contribute to the parents' household expenses should be con-
sidered in the awarding of alimony and child support payments.52 Inas-
much as the right to alimony terminates upon the death of the husband,
it is erroneous for a chancellor to decree that the husband maintain a life
insurance policy with his wife as the beneficiary, although an order to
maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of minor children would
manded with the chancellor being directed to consider if alimony should be awarded upon
the proper grounds and to consider whether the wife was entitled to reimbursement for
money expended for family purposes.
47. Marcel v. Marcel, 132 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
48. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So.2d 206, 224 (Fla. 1961).
49. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 136 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
50. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 136 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (dicta). The court did
affirm an award of $200 per month.
51. Peteler v. Peteler, 145 So.2d 291, 292 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d
1236 (1960).
52. Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So.2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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seem permissible. It would also seem to be error to order the husband to
maintain health insurance policies with the wife as one of the bene-
ficiaries if her inclusion entails any added expense to the husband."
C. Lump Sum Alimony
A lump-sum alimony award which has been left undisturbed upon
an appeal of the case may not be modified upon remand because the
award has become vested.5 A wife cannot be awarded the family home
as lump sum permanent alimony in addition to periodic alimony pay-
ments; 5 however, this type of award will now be proper under the
amended statute." It is reversible error for a chancellor to approve the
report of a special master who recommended an award of lump sum
alimony without giving the husband an opportunity to inquire into his
wife's assets at the time of their marriage and her ability to earn a living,
and who failed to make a determination as to the husband's ability to
pay alimony.57
Three cases dealing with lump sum alimony which were appealed
because of the amount awarded are discussed in the notes."
D. Appeals
In a case of first impression under Amended Rule 3.8 of the Florida
Appellate Rules,5 9 it has been held that if the wife has accepted the
payment of alimony and expenses she has waived her right to appeal as
53. Putman v. Putman, 154 So.2d 717 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has held that a Florida court has no power (in the absence of an agree-
ment) to award alimony which would continue after the death of the husband, and, thus,
a judgment of this kind would not be given full faith and credit. Aldrich v. Alrich, 127
S.E.2d 385 (W.Va. 1962), cert. granted, 84 Sup. Ct. 305 (1963). Questions dealing with
Florida law were certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by a prior opinion, Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 84 Sup. Ct. 184 (1963).
54. Latta v. Latta, 135 So.2d 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
55. May v. May, 142 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
56. Note 75 infra.
57. Heller v. Heller, 151 So.2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The parties had been married
less than four years. The husband was 70 years old and the wife was 57, and both of them
had grown children by prior marriages. The husband contended that the lump sum alimony
constituted approximately 70 percent of his life savings.
58. The second district has approved a lump sum alimony award of $5,000 in cash,
$15,000 in land and $2,500 as attorney's fees which, when added to property she had acquired
from the husband during the marriage, totaled approximately one-third of the husband's
net worth of $290,000. It would appear that the award was based, at least in part, upon the
fact that the plaintiff-wife had cohabited illicitly with the defendant for nineteen years
prior to their marriage. Klaber v. Klaber, 133 So.2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
When the wife owns her own home and has other assets worth from $5,000 to $10,000,
she is 51 years old and has no special training for earning a living except in the selling of
dogs and the husband has a net worth of $63,500, an award of $35,000 as lump sum alimony
is excessive and should be reduced to $15,000. Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So.2d 473 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1963).
When the undisputed evidence shows that the husband has assets worth more than
$1,600,000, it is not an abuse of discretion to award the wife $300,000 as lump sum alimony.
Udell v. Udell, 151 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
59. FLA. R. App. P. 3.8.
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to the amount of these awards unless she has received an order from the
trial court for payment of alimony pending the appeal.60 What objection
would there be to amending the rule again by providing that the ac-
ceptance of the alimony would not preclude the wife from appealing the
amount awarded? Under the present rule, the wife is forced to insist
upon a further hearing for the award of alimony, pending the appeal.
This entails further delay and expense to the parties and the courts with-
out any reason except arid formality.
E. Modification
It is improper for a chancellor to order a reduction in alimony pay-
ments solely because of a decrease in the husband's income without con-
sidering the husband's non-income-producing property.6' It is also er-
roneous to modify an alimony or support decree unless the question of
modification is presented to the court in an appropriate proceeding and
each party is given an opportunity to be heard.62 On the other hand, it
would appear that a chancellor's order of a reduction in future support
payment without an express finding that the husband is unable to pay
accrued unpaid support will be affirmed when the record supplies the
necessary basis for the decree. 3
The multi-faceted decision of Hartley v. Hartley64 held: (1) When a
wife received notice of hearing on the husband's petition for modification
of alimony payments one day after the date of the hearing, she was not
afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard; (2) A Motion to vacate
the order was the proper procedure and this motion need not be filed
within ten days of the order because it is not controlled by Rule 3.16 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,6" which pertains to motions for
rehearing; (3) The wife's acceptance of past-due alimony, as ordered by
the lower court, would not estop her from contesting the order since there
was no controversy as to the amount of the past-due alimony; the doc-
trine of estoppel would be applicable only when there was a controversy
as to the amount of the arrearages.
F. Enforcement
A judgment or decree of a sister state providing for periodic alimony
and child support payments is entitled to full faith and credit as to ac-
crued installments unless the decree is subject to retroactive modification
in the state of rendition. Nevertheless, if the parties agreed prior to the
entry of the foreign decree that the husband's obligation would be less
than the amounts provided for in a separation agreement which was the
60. Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
61. Simon v. Simon, 137 So.2d 613 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
62. Taylor v. Taylor, 143 So.2d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
63. Mann v. Mann, 145 So.2d 886 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
64. 134 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
65. FLA. R. Crv. P. 3.16.
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foundation of the foreign decree, and if the parties acted upon the
strength of this second agreement, the trial court would be justified in
refusing to enter a judgment for any arrears ostensibly owing under the
foreign decree. Further, the trial court would be justified in transferring
the case from the law side to the equity side for enforcement of the child
support provisions of the foreign decree."6 In a somewhat similar vein, a
chancellor may refuse to enforce accrued sums of alimony and child
support by equitable process; however, he may not reduce sums which
are due and payable under a prior domestic decree. Upon proper request,
the chancellor may enter a judgment which would be enforceable at law
for the accrued sums.6
7
Inasmuch as contempt orders must be definite and certain as to the
amounts that the contemnor must pay in order to purge himself, it is error
for a chancellor to fix a certain amount of support payments as being
accrued and then allowing the contemnor ninety days to purge himself by
making "substantial payment."68 Further, it is error to hold the contemnor
in contempt and then to defer punishment if he makes "substantial pay-
ment"69 in ninety days, with an alternative "to appear before this Court
without further notice, for sentencing for contempt of this Court 7 1 if the
payment is not made.
The rather unclear opinion in Naster v. Naster71 seems to hold that
inability to pay accrued sums of alimony is no defense unless the hus-
band-contemnor clearly shows that his inability is not caused by his own
neglect or misconduct but by factors beyond his control.
When an insurance company denies liability under its policy of in-
surance issued to a husband, it is improper for the wife to attempt to
take the deposition of an agent of the company and to force him to pro-
duce documents by means of a notice subsequent to the entry of the
divorce decree. Under Rule 1.28 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 72
the deposition and the production of records can be made only by way of
motion, not by notice.78
A wife has standing to bring an action against third-party grantees
to set aside conveyances made by her ex-husband in an attempt to de-
fraud her of her rights to alimony, and her ex-husband is not an indis-
pensable party. Further, when the grantees are related to the ex-husband
this tends to establish a prima facie case which must be met by evidence
by the transferees.74
66. Kramer v. Kramer, 146 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
67. Goff v. Goff, 151 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
68. Hilson v. lilson, 145 So.2d 557, 558-9 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
69. Id. at 558.
70. Ibid.
71. 151 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
72. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
73. McKinley & Co. v. Arpin, 143 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
74. Frell v. Frell, 154 So.2d 706 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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G. Legislation
A long line of Florida cases has been destroyed by an amendment
to the Florida Statutes providing that "[i] n any award of permanent ali-
mony the court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic payments or
payment in lump sum, or both, in its discretion. ' 75 This amendment will
be an excellent vehicle to further an increase in appeals.
VII. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A. Jurisdiction and Conflicts
Despite the very broad wording in Rhoades v. Bohn,78 which seemed
to state that the Florida courts will have jurisdiction over a child custody
case even though the child does not reside in Florida, the First District
Court of Appeal has held in Smith v. Davis" that the real holding in
Rhoades was that once a court acquires jurisdiction of a resident minor
as an ancillary phase of a divorce case, the court will have continuing
jurisdiction which will not be affected by the child's later removal to a
foreign state. Under the holding of Rhoades and Smith the non-residence
of the minor has no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction only in a
custody case which is supplemental to an original proceeding wherein the
court had jurisdiction over the minor because he was residing within the
state. If the case involves the initial determination of the custody of a
minor, he must be within the state at the time the case is instituted. It
would appear that if a parent removes his child to a foreign state before
the initial suit is instituted, the Florida Courts will be unable to give relief
unless "the party having custody of the minor voluntarily submits to the
court's jurisdiction and litigates in an adversary manner the merits of the
issue on which a decree of custody depends."7 8 The author submits that
this jurisdictional morass has been judicially created by the courts'
labeling of a child as a "res" equivalent to property. Inasmuch as the
courts of one state are not bound to give full faith and credit to the
custody decrees of a foreign state,79 there does not seem to be any com-
pelling reason for stating that jurisdiction depends upon physical presence
of the child within the rendering state.
As previously stated, custody decrees of a foreign state are not
necessarily entitled to full faith and credit. As a result of this principle,
the third district has held that even though a wife was granted custody
by an Ohio court conditioned upon her remaining in the state, Florida
can refuse to give credit to a decree of the Ohio court taking custody
away from her and giving it to the husband because she took the child to
75. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-145. (Emphasis added.)
76. 114 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959), aff'd, 121 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1960).
77. 147 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
78. Rhoades v. Bohn, 114 So.2d 493, 496 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
79. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) and cases cited in note 80 infra. See also 16 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 753 (1962).
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California. Further, Florida can ignore a California decree which recog-
nized the Ohio decree under the doctrine of comity. The court con-
sidered that the bad faith of the wife in ignoring the decrees of Ohio and
California would not be the determining factor as to custody; rather, the
question should be determined by the best interests of the child. The
court then continued custody in the wife. 0 Although it is difficult to dis-
agree with the court's concept that the best interests of the child should
be controlling, one begins to wonder about the efficacy of equity decrees
enjoining a parent who has custody from removing the child from the
state without a court order. One also begins to wonder: Whatever hap-
pened to the clean hands doctrine?
The doctrine of comity was further discussed (perhaps eviscerated
would be the better word) in two cases. In the first it was ruled that
Florida courts will refuse to give comity to a Mexican divorce decree
(which incorporated a separation agreement providing for the custody of
a child) in the absence of proof that the decree partook "of the elements
which would support it if procured in this country, such as grounds and
domicile."'" All that this decision accomplished was to allow one of the
parties to ignore his own separation agreement. In the second case,82 the
majority of the court effectively destroyed the concept of comity by
stating that the chancellor could go behind a foreign habeas corpus decree
in order to determine "the manner in which the case was litigated which
resulted in the judgment or decree of custody."88 The fact that both
parties might have been before the foreign court and were afforded ample
opportunity to develop fully their evidence on the custody issue would be
only one factor in determining whether recognition or enforcement should
be given the foreign decree. Sturgis, J., dissenting, said that absent a
showing of the invalidity of the decree or a showing that it is contrary
to the public policy of Florida, comity requires that Florida recognize the
foreign decree as controlling the status of the parties as of the date of
rendition. "The doctrine of comity between the states contemplates much
more than a shallow jug from which to pour according to 'expediency' or
'courtesy.' "84
Florida does not have a statute which forbids the removal of a child
from the state by the parent who was granted custody, and when the
final decree determining custody does not forbid a change of residence,
the custodian may change the child's residence to a foreign state and
thereby effectively deprive the other parent of his rights of visitation.
80. State v. Webster, 151 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); accord, Tom v. State, 153
So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
81. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), following Pawley v.
Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950). For the concept of "divisible divorce" articulated in the
Pawley case, see 76 HARv. L. REV. 1233 (1963).
82. Neal v. State, 135 So.2d 891, 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
83. Id. at 895.
84. Id. at 901.
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Similarly, a custodian may remove the child to another county within the
state, and a chancellor would not have authority to enter a post-decree
order forbiding this change of residence when the original final decree
was silent on this matter.8" It may be asked: Even if the court does for-
bid the removal of the child what good will it do when another court feels
free to disregard the first court's order?
B. Criteria for Determining Custody
When there is a continued pattern of parental irresponsibility on the
part of the mother, the chancellor may be justified in awarding custody of
minor children to their father, although "adultery or marital misconduct
in and of itself does not necessarily demonstrate that a parent is unfit
to have custody of the children."8 6 On the other hand, it would appear
that in three cases the courts have taken a jaundiced look at the mother's
indulgence in adultery or addiction to alcohol and have awarded custody
to the father. 7
In a custody contest between the natural parents of minor children
and others who have had custody of the children, the court must consider
in addition to the natural rights of the parents, the following factors:
(1) the natural ties and affections formed by children for the persons
who have had custody; (2) the character of the adults involved; (3) the
age, health, sex and moral surroundings of the children; (4) the bene-
fits of education and development, as well as pecuniary prospects and the
general overall welfare of the minors. It would appear that even if the
above factors are roughly equal, the scales will be tipped in favor of the
persons for whom the minors have expressed a great preference, taking
into account their age and stage of intellectual development.88
The "God-given right" of a natural parent to the custody of his
children is not an infinite right; it is always subject to the best interests
of the children." When both parents are fit to have the custody of a
two-year-old child, the law will favor giving the mother custody because
of the "tender age of the child."9
In a case of first impression, it has been held that the report of a
social study from the State Welfare Department in a child custody case
must be introduced into evidence and be made a part of the record before
85. McCrillis v. McCrilis, 147 So.2d 584 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); accord, Millman v.
Millman, 148 So.2d 728 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
86. Bennett v. Bennett, 146 So.2d 588, 591 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
87. Koones v. Koones, 149 So.2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 145
So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). Sugg v. Sugg, 134 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) was a
per curiam affirmed opinion and Judge Sturgis, concurring specially, seemed to approve
the change of custody of three children from their mother to their father because the mother
was living in adultery.
88. Justice v. Van Eepoel, 132 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1961).
89. In re Pendarvis, 133 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
90. Bargeon v. Bargeon, 153 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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it may be considered by the lower court. Consideration of the report with-
out its being made a part of the record is reversible error."'
C. Divided Custody
In the last Survey the author stated that "[i]t now seems fairly
well established that it is within the discretion of the chancellor to pro-
vide that one parent should have custody of the children during the
school year and the other parent should have custody during the summer
vacation."'1 Three cases were cited in support of this statement. Since
that time four cases have been decided which are not consistent. The
third district has held that "[d]ivided custody which involves periodic
removal from familiar surroundings is not desirable nor conducive to a
child's welfare,"9 and reversed a chancellor who had awarded custody
of a two-year-old boy to the mother during the week and to the father
during weekends. The chancellor was directed to give sole custody to
the mother with reasonable rights of visitation to the father. The Second
District has held that "[w]hile the division of custody is not normally
approved, there are circumstances where such is justifiable and there is
no clear showing of error on the part of the chancellor." 94 However, the
second district, despite the preceding comment, seemingly approved
orders of divided custody in two later cases.9 5 The question of divided
custody would now seem to depend upon the district in which the problem
is presented or the skill of the appealing party in demonstrating a "clear
showing of error on the part of the Chancellor."9 " It would seem that
"law" ought to be a little more certain and uniform.
D. Modification of Custody
The third district has held that a petition which alleges "in general
terms that the appellant is not providing a proper home for the child"9 "
is sufficient to state a cause of action even though it fails to allege the
facts upon which the charge is based: It would appear that this decision
has countenanced "notice pleading" in custody matters.
In the absence of proper pleading and proof, it is error to modify a
final decree by eliminating a clause providing for reasonable rights of
visitation by a father denied custody of the children. It would appear
that the foregoing rule would not prevent a court in the event of an
emergency from making temporary orders which might affect the right
91. McGuire v. McGuire, 140 So.2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
92. Murray, Family Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 177, 192 (1961).
93. Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So.2d 397, 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
94. Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). The court did affirm
an order of divided custody in spite of this language.
95. Udell v. Udell, 151 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Montgomery v. Montgomery,
142 So.2d 326 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
96. Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). See Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d
695 (1963).
97. Cushen v. Cushen, 143 So.2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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of visitation, but in the ordinary case the wife must request the elimina-
tion of the visitation right and the parties must be given an opportunity
to present evidence relating to the request.9 8
When the parents of a child have provided in a separation agreement
that the wife (a resident of New York) should have custody, the chan-
cellor should not change custody to the father (a resident of Florida)
merely because he believes that "a child in the City of New York needs
close supervision that only a father can give." 99
E. Custody and the Law of Torts
A divorced mother may sue for the wrongful death of her child even
though the mother's right of custody under a divorce decree was vitiated
when she remarried her husband, and then subsequently divorced him
with the second decree failing to mention the question of custody. °0 The
Wrongful Death Statute provides quite clearly that the cause of action
is vested in the "father [who was alive in the instant case] of such minor
child, or if the father be not living, the mother may maintain an action.'' l
However, the majority of the court considered itself bound by the hold-
ing in Wiggins v. Florida Motor Lines, Inc.'°2 The decision may be justi-
fied by the fact that the father had allegedly abandoned the child, who
was supported entirely by the mother; hard cases make bad law.
In another case of first impression, it was decided that a parent may
not maintain a tort action against an unemancipated minor child for the
wrongful death of another minor child of the parent; the decision was
placed squarely upon the public policy of Florida in the "necessity for
the encouragement of family unity and the maintenance of family disci-
pline." 0 3 In addition to the statutory method of emancipation, the court
gave countenance to the view that emancipation may be shown by "a
complete severance of the filial tie."'14 The above decision was held, in a
successor case,'0 5 to operate as an estoppel by judgment against the
nominal administrator's action against the same minor defendant be-
cause, in both cases, the father was the real party in interest. When will
the courts realize that decisions of this nature are not protecting "family
unity" but only the insurance companies?
98. Scheer v. Scheer, 132 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
99. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
100. Covey v. Eppes, 153 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1963), reversing Eppes v. Covey, 141 So.2d
747 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), noted in 17 U. MemMi L. REV. 107 (1962).
101. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1961).
102. 150 Fla. 848, 9 So.2d 98 (1942).
103. Meehan v. Meehan, 133 So.2d 776, 777 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
104. Id. at 779.
105. Russell v. Meehan, 141 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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VIII. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Award
An award of child support need not be confined to future payments;
the court may enter a retroactive award for the period when the mother
was providing for the child prior to the entry of the final decree.1"6 A
father who is ordered to pay alimony and child support in one lump sum
is entitled to have the court specify what portion is for child support
and what portion is for alimony.107
B. Modification
The Florida courts are empowered by statute'018 to modify the child
support provisions of a separation agreement executed in a foreign
state.'09 In the absence of a proper foundation in the pleadings and an
opportunity afforded to the adverse party to be heard on the matter, it is
error for the chancellor to reduce the amount of child support." 0
The mere fact that a minor child is now in the armed services is not
sufficient in itself to enable an appellate court to reverse a chancellor
who has refused to modify a child support award, in the absence of an
appellate record showing what evidence or testimony was considered by
the chancellor."' It may be asked, what further testimony was needed?
When the parties have agreed to reduce the amount of child support
payments as provided in a divorce decree, the wife has no standing to
enforce the original decree when the husband has complied with their
subsequent agreement. Further, even though the husband's current in-
come is relatively small, the fact that he has considerable wealth may
justify an increase in child support payments in order that the children
may have a standard of living commensurate with that of the father." 2
In a case"13 of apparent first impression, the second district has held
that a post-decretal order increasing the amount of child support pay-
ments is reviewable only by interlocutory appeal under Rule 4.2 of the
Florida Appellate Rules" 4 and not by direct appeal under Rule 3.211 or
106. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 148 So.2d 737 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
107. Beasley v. Beasley, 154 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 147
So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1110 (1961).
108. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1961). See Annots., 89 A.L.R.2d 7 (1963); 89 A.L.R.2d 106
(1963).
109. Margolis v. Margolis, 141 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
110. Keathley v. Elb, 133 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
111. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 135 So.2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). It is the author's view
that the dissenting opinion of Carroll, J., that the case should have been remanded for
further testimony in order to determine the need, if any, of child support, was correct. The
majority view in effect forced the husband to file a new petition for modification and then
effectively destroyed any basis for the modification.
112. Luedke v. Behringer, 143 So.2d 218 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
113. Finneran v. Finneran, 137 So.2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
114. FLA. R. App. P. 4.2.
115. FIA. R. App. P. 3.2.
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by certiorari. It should be noted that this decision applies only to post-
decretal orders or decrees which are interlocutory in nature; if the par-
ticular post-decretal order or decree constitutes a final adjudication,
then a direct appeal would be in order under Rule 3.2.
A clause in a divorce decree which provided for future considera-
tion by the court of a petition by the wife for the college education of a
child at the expense of the husband when the child reached college age
was disapproved on the ground that the chancellor "may not make a
declaratory decree as to facts which may or may not occur in the
future." '116 The court did not decide whether a father is legally obligated
to defray the costs of his child's college education because the question
was not presented. 117
On the other hand, a decree which provided that the amount of sup-
port payments for a wife and child should be reduced if the minor child
"fails or refuses to attend the public schools""' has been approved. The
apparent basis of the decision was the idea that this provision was de-
signed as an incentive for the child to continue his education and that if
the child should fail to do so for any reason, the trial court could modify
the decree in the best interests of the child.
C. Enforcement
A Florida court which grants a divorce and awards child support
has jurisdiction to enforce the support provisions even though the wife
subsequently moves to New York and the husband moves to Mexico.
The proceeding is a continuation of the original one and reasonable
notice to defend may be served by mail.'19
The district courts of appeal are inconsistent on again another issue.
The third district has held that a Florida court has no right to condition
a father's right of visitation upon his timely payment of future child
support as provided in a divorce decree. 20 It would appear that this
case is in direct conflict with Hardy v. Hardy'2' decided by the first
district. Also in opposition to the third district's decision, the second
district has held that courts should not ordinarily order a father to make
child support payments in accordance with a prior divorce decree so
long as the mother fails to accord him visitation privileges granted in
the divorce decree. Further, a court should not order the father to pay
116. Harris v. Harris, 138 So.2d 376, 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
117. See 15 U. MiAMI L. REV. 108 (1960) ; Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957).
118. Beasley v. Beasley, 154 So.2d 874, 875 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
119. Prensky v. Prensky, 146 So.2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
120. Howard v. Howard, 143 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
121. 118 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); accord, Clawson v. Clawson, 125 So.2d 104
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
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any arrearages of child support which accrued during the time that the
mother has denied him visitation privileges.' 22
Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,12a it
would appear proper for a Florida court to enter a final decree based
solely upon the authenticated transcript of the proceedings in a foreign
state when the Florida husband has failed to introduce any testimony
in rebuttal of the foreign proceedings, which are presumed to be prima
facie correct. 124 Whether the failure of the wife to testify in person or by
deposition in Florida could be raised by a husband who presented testi-
mony in rebuttal was not decided.
Rule 1.5(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 25 provides that
oral agreements between parties or their counsel will not be valid unless
made in the presence of the court. Therefore, the chancellor may disre-
gard an oral stipulation of counsel agreeing to the amount of arrearages
of child support under a foreign decree, even though the judge is in-
formed of the stipulation when the final decree is presented for his sig-
nature.
A sentence of a father for a term of two years in the state prison for
the crime of withholding support from his minor children is excessive
when the maximum imprisonment under the statute at the time of the
conviction 127 was one year, although the sentence was imposed after the
revocation of probation and after the statute had been amended 2 ' by
increasing the maximum sentence to two years. 29
IX. ANTENUPTIAL AND SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 1 30
A. Antenuptial Agreements
Litigation, like fashion, seems to go in cycles and the vogue now
seems to be antenuptial agreements-with a four-fold increase in cases
over the preceding two-year period.
In a four-to-three decision,' the Supreme Court of Florida has
articulated the following rules to be followed in determining the validity
of antenuptial agreements: (1) There must be a fair and reasonable
122. Denton v. Denton, 147 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
123. FLA. STAT. ch. 88 (1961).
124. Clark v. Clark, 139 So.2d 195 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
125. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.5(d).
126. Morris v. Truax, 152 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
127. FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1955).
128. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-147.
129. Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1962).
130. The reader is referred to Beuchert, Power of Florida Courts to Modify Marital
Settlements, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 487 (1963) for a comprehensive analysis of this field.
131. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962), reversing 132 So.2d 771
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). For subsequent proceedings dealing with appellate jurisdiction, see
Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 152 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1963) ; 157 So.2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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provision for the wife, or if it is not fair, a full and frank disclosure of
the husband's worth must be made to the wife before she signs the agree-
ment, or in the absence of this disclosure, she must have "a general and
approximate knowlege . . . of the prospective husband's property.'M
32
(2) "[S]he must have signed freely and voluntarily, preferably, but not
necessarily a required pre-requisite, upon competent and independent
advice."'8 3 (3) Inadequate provisions for the wife will not invalidate
the agreement if she had some understanding of her rights and had been
fully informed by the husband as to his worth, or if "she had or reason-
ably should have had"'84 a general and approximate knowledge of his
worth in the event that the husband failed to disclose this information.
(4) In determining the fairness of the agreement the courts will con-
sider matters which include the relative situation of the parties, their
respective properties, their family ties and connections and the wife's
needs. (5) The fairness of the agreement is measured primarily by
whether the provisions of the agreement will allow her to live after a
divorce "in a manner reasonably consonant with her way of life before
such dissolution.' 8 5 (6) Ordinarily, the burden of proving the invalidity
of the agreement rests upon the wife, but if the agreement is unreason-
able on its face a presumption of concealment arises and the burden
then shifts to the husband. However, this presumption should not be
automatic; it depends upon such factors as the experience and knowl-
edge of the parties. (7) "The test is the adequacy of the knowledge of
the woman-she must have had some understanding of her rights and
a general and approximate knowlege of his property and resources. The
basic issue is concealment, not the absence of disclosure . . . .,, s The
author submits that this decision is going to plague the courts because
the stress it places upon disclosure is immediately counter-balanced by
the notion that the wife is bound by the agreement if "she had or reason-
ably should have had"' 87 (shades of tort lawl) a general and approxi-
mate knowledge of her future husband's wealth.
It would appear that a prospective bride may divest herself in an
antenuptial agreement of all homestead rights in the property owned
by the prospective husband.' It has been held in the past that a widow's
allowance 89 from the estate of a deceased husband may be awarded
prior to a determination of the validity of an antenuptial agreement; 10
however, the question as to whether a widow's support allowance will be
132. 143 So.2d at 20.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Id. at 21.
137. Id. at 20.
138. Johnson v. Johnson, 140 So.2d 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
139. FLA. STAT. § 733.20(1)(d) (1961).
140. In re Stein's Estate, 106 So.2d 2 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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barred by a valid antenuptial agreement remains unanswered.' If the
widow can divest herself of any rights of homestead by an antenuptial
agreement, there should be little question that she can likewise divest
herself of any claim for a widow's allowance.
A widow's complaint against the executor of her husband's estate
for a declaratory judgment, alleging the invalidity of an antenuptial
agreement, fails to state a cause of action when it fails to allege: (1)
that the executor has asserted any rights under the agreement; (2)
that the widow has elected to take dower; and (3) that her husband
conveyed any property during his lifetime without her joinder or con-
sent pursuant to the terms of the agreement. If her husband did convey
property without her consent, then the grantees would be necessary
parties. 42
B. Separation Agreements
1. APPROVAL AND EFFECT
In the absence of fraud, concealment or overreaching, a chancellor
should respect a property settlement agreement, and he is not at liberty
to accept part of the agreement and omit another part without according
an opportunity to be heard to the party who has had a decree pro con-
fesso entered against him. If real property which was the subject matter
of the omitted clause has been destroyed by fire subsequent to the execu-
tion of the agreement, the chancellor may take testimony in order to
determine the rights of the parties in the fire insurance proceeds. 4 '
When a property settlement has been made by the parties and ap-
proved by a divorce decree of another state's court which had jurisdic-
tion over the parties, the wife cannot subsequently bring a suit to impose
a resulting trust on a land trust allegedly purchased by the husband
with funds belonging to the wife prior to the execution of the agree-
ment.1
44
2. CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION
Under a clause in a separation agreement which provided that the
husband was to "continue to make all mortgage payments on said prop-
erty [a home and a vacant lot] and to maintain and support the First
Party and the minor children of the parties in the identical manner that
they have been maintained and supported since the separation of the
parties,"'45 the court construed that the husband was obligated to pay
all the real estate taxes assessed against the home. However, the court
141. In re Anderson's Estate, 149 So.2d 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
142. Miller v. Miller, 151 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
143. McNeil v. McNeill, 135 So.2d 785 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1961).
144. Jones v. Jones, 140 So.2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
145. Hall v. Hall, 135 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
19631
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
determined that there was no intent apparent in the agreement or in the
record that the husband was to pay the taxes assessed against the vacant
property as part of the maintenance and support of the wife and chil-
dren. It would appear that if the wife is forced to pay the taxes from the
support money received from her husband, she is not going to be sup-
ported in the "identical manner" as in the past.
A property settlement agreement which provides that the mother
is to have custody of the minor children and that she will give them a
Roman Catholic education "if such should be reasonably available"'4
cannot be modified by allowing the mother to enroll the children in a
private non-Catholic school and ordering the father to pay the increased
tuition because the wife would encounter difficulties in performing the
agreement.
A separation agreement which has been approved by a divorce de-
cree will not be modified because the wife was emotionally upset when
she signed it unless her emotional state prevented her from making an
independent assessment of the net worth of her husband.'
It is error for a chancellor to cancel support payments which have
accrued under a separation agreement and to reduce future payments in
the absence of any changes in the circumstances of the parties. 48 Query:
does a court have power to cancel accrued support payments under a
separation agreement even if there are changes in the circumstances of
the parties?
X. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The federal courts will entertain a suit by a wife against her hus-
band, the beneficiary of an Illinois trust, and the trustee to set aside a
supplemental trust agreement allegedly executed during the pendency
of separate maintenance proceedings in order to deprive her of a fair
allowance from the husband. The action was in personam against the
beneficiary and the trustee and not against the trust res located in
Illinois. The court noted that the wife allegedly was unaware of the ex-
istence of the original trust and the supplemental trust agreement until
after she had filed the separate maintenance suit. The court cited the
law of Illinois as controlling the question of setting aside the agreement
for fraud upon the wife. 4 '
A court has no power to award separate maintenance to a wife
146. Butler v. Butler, 132 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). Subsequently, the juve-
nile court modified this education clause on the basis that the welfare of the children was
affected. In re W.S.B., 157 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
147. Cross v. Cross, 151 So.2d 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
148. Brenske v. Brenske, 151 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
149. Sax v. Sax, 294 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961).
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when she has relinquished any claim to alimony in a separation agree-
ment, unless the court invalidates the agreement. 50
It is error for a chancellor to decree that a wife has "the right to
live separate and apart from"'' her husband when she has asked for
separate maintenance'52 because this will be construed as the granting
of a limited divorce, which is forbidden in Florida.5" The court has no
power in a separate maintenance proceeding' to award lump sum ali-
mony or to order a division of the property of the parties; however, the
court may provide that a home owned as an estate by the entireties
shall be used by the wife and children as part of their separate mainte-
nance,' 55 and the court may further adjudicate a dispute concerning the
ownership of personal property claimed by the spouses. 5
Separate maintenance under section 65.10 of the Florida Statutes 58
is predicated upon the concept that the wife must be living apart from
her husband through his fault. Therefore, if the husband has made re-
peated offers of unconditional reconciliation and the wife has failed to
return because "she was not well"' 57 this negates the allegation that she
is living apart through his fault. Similarly, it would appear that a wife
will not be entitled to an award of separate maintenance if she has re-
fused to make a reasonable effort to join her husband in his new domicile,
even though the statutory desertion period of one year has not elapsed. 58
Under the statute just mentioned,'59 the Florida courts have jurisdiction
over suits brought for alimony unconnected with causes for divorce even
though neither party is a resident of Florida, and even though the hus-
band's property which is sought to be reached is not in the state. 0
XI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Tax Problems
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided two cases
which may have a serious impact upon the amount of attorney's fees
in divorce cases. In the first case, United States v. Gilmore, 6' the Court
150. Hostler v. Hostler, 151 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
151. Hieber v. Hieber, 151 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
152. FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1961).
153. FLA. STAT. § 65.03 (1961).
154. FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1961).
155. Zakutney v. Zakutney, 151 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Smith v. Smith, 151
So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
155a. Smith v. Smith, 160 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1964), reversing Smith v. Smith, 151 So.2d
448 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) on this point.
156. Fi. STAT. § 65.10 (1961).
157. Stone v. Stone, 151 So.2d 301, 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
158. Fisher v. Fisher, 134 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
159. FiA. STAT. § 65.10 (1961).
160. St. Anne Airways, Inc. v. Webb, 142 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
161. 372 U.S. 39 (1963); discussed in The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv.
152-56 (1963).
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held that section 23162 of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits de-
ductions from gross income of "ordinary and necessary expenses . . . in-
curred ... for the conservation . . . of property held for the production
of income," will not include fees paid by a husband in defending a di-
vorce suit and preserving his controlling interest in a business from the
claims of his wife. In the second case, United States v. Patrick,' the
Court held that section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,"64
which permits deductions of the same nature as enumerated in section
23 above, will not include fees paid by a husband to his attorneys and
the attorneys of his wife for services performed in negotiating a property
settlement whereby the husband retained control of his business and real
property. The rationale of both cases was that the claims of the wives
arose out of the marital relationship and not out of the business ac-
tivities of the husbands. It would seem logical to predict that these cases
will result in lower fees being paid to attorneys. In the past, clients could
afford to be generous if the fees were being paid, in effect, by the
treasury.
B. Power to Award
It would now appear settled that when a chancellor reserves juris-
diction in a divorce decree to award alimony in the future, this reserva-
tion is not broad enough to empower the court to award attorney's fees
in the future."' 5 In the first definitive ruling in Florida on a knotty ques-
tion, a district court has held 16 1 that when a husband and wife have re-
solved their differences and resumed cohabitation, the chancellor may
dismiss a divorce suit but retain jurisdiction in order to enter an order
against the husband for his wife's attorney's fees and costs. The court
seemingly followed the rationale (as disclosed in the court file) of
Baldwin v. Baldwin6 7 and distinguished the seemingly contrary holding
of Welborn v. Welborn,.6 which held only that the lower court lost juris-
diction over a case after the expiration of a term of court and, therefore,
could not enter an award of attorney's fees during a subsequent term.
On the other hand, the death of a wife during the pendency of a divorce
proceeding terminates the proceedings and thereby prevents the chan-
cellor from awarding attorney's fees for services rendered to the wife
prior to her death."6 9
162. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(2), 53 Stat. 1 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 212).
163. 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
164. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2).
165. Cone v. Cone, 132 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) following Zoercher v. Zoercher,
114 So.2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
166. Hadlock v. Hadlock, 137 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). See Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d
1009 (1963).
167. 154 Fla. 624, 18 So.2d 681 (1944).
168. 47 Fla. 348, 36 So. 61 (1904).
169. Rosenhouse v. Ever, 150 So.2d 732 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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In another case of first impression, the third district has held that
attorney's contingent fee employment contracts in matrimonial actions
are against public policy and are not enforceable. °
In an apparent case of first impression, it has been held that the
Florida Statutes' 7 ' providing for "suit" money for the wife in divorce
matters refer solely to causes of action instituted in Florida and exclude
compensation for services rendered to the wife "long before the 'suit' is
brought in this jurisdiction."'1 72 It was also decided that it was error to
award attorneys' fees to foreign attorneys based upon their invoice be-
cause this is not adequate proof to support an award.
The general rule is that a non-resident party-witness to one legal
proceeding is immune from service of process in another proceeding. This
rule will be applied when a non-resident former husband is bringing a
second action against the wife for child custody; he is immune from
service of process brought by his former Florida attorney for unpaid
legal services rendered in the first Florida child custody case.Y
The usual rule that an attorney's fee is not allowable when the wife
petitions for an increase in a child support award should be applied even
though the father in his answer has asked for a change of custody, pro-
vided that the father's request was never litigated and the wife never
prepared to litigate this issue by discovery or other methods .1 4 It would
appear that a chancellor has no power to award attorney's fees to a
husband because his wife has filed a "frivolous" motion to transfer the
questions of child custody and support to the juvenile court from the
circuit court.
175
In Cone v. Cone 71 the court seemingly affirmed a chancellor's
award of attorney's fees for services performed in the trial court as well
as in three prior appellate proceedings despite the fact that the Florida
Appellate Rules 7 7 provide that the appellate court has the sole power
to make an award for services performed in an appellate court.
C. Discretionary Factors
It is not an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to refuse to order
the husband to pay his wife's attorney's fees when she is able to pay
them; conversely, it will not be an abuse of discretion if the chancellor
does order the husband to pay a portion of his wife's attorney's fees even
170. Sobieski v. Maresco, 143 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
171. FLA. STAT. §§ 65.07 & 65.08 (1961).
172. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 154 So.2d 899, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
173. Lawson v. Benson, 136 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
174. Harris v. Harris, 138 So.2d 376 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
175. Friedman v. Friedman, 144 So.2d 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
176. 142 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
177. FLA. R, APP. P. 3.16.
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if she is able to pay them. 81 7 It is to be wondered if this area of discre-
tion is not a little too broad.
The second district has approved an award of $10,000 as attorney's
fees when the undisputed testimony of attorneys disclosed that a reason-
able fee would be between $20,000 and $35,000."7 It is submitted that
judicial discretion should be limited by the undisputed testimony in a
case.
XII. GUARDIANSHIP AND CURATORSHIP
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
The guardianship laws provide in the case of incompetents that "the
venue shall be in the county where the incompetent resides,"'"" and that
whenever "the domicile of an incompetent is changed to another county,
the guardian of said incompetent ... may have the venue of said guard-
ianship changed to the county of acquired domicile." 81 The court in
the case of In re Guardianship of Mickler8 2 has interpreted the word
venue "as denoting a limitation upon jurisdiction .... ,,l83 Further, the
word resides means "the last place of legal residence ... prior to the ad-
judication of incompetency,' 8 4 and the word domicile means "legal
domicile of the incompetent .... " ", As a result of these interpretations
the court held that the county judge's court of the county where an in-
competent had resided for many years had jurisdiction over incompe-
tency proceedings, 'while the court where the incompetent had lived for
approximately one week immediately prior to the adjudication was with-
out jurisdiction and its appointment of a guardian was subject to col-
lateral attack. It seems that the court held that "jurisdiction and venue
are synonymous . . . ."I" This result is wrong conceptually, a misinter-
pretation of the statute, and seemingly inconsistent with In re De Hart.'
The county judge's court of one county which has jurisdiction over
a probate proceeding has jurisdiction to award attorneys fees to an at-
torney for a minor legatee even though that same county judge's court
has transferred jurisdiction over the guardianship of the minor legatee
to the county judge's court of another county.'
178. Turney v. Turney, 149 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; accord, Arrington v. Arring-
ton, 150 So.2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). For the converse situation, see Helsel v. Helsel,
138 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). For some unusual factors considered by an appellate
court in awarding attorney's fees and court costs to the wife, see Ames v. Ames, 153 So.2d
737 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
179. Udell v. Udell, 151 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
180. FLA. STAT. § 744.11(1) (1961).
181. FLA. STAT. § 744.11(4) (1961).
182. 152 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
183. Id. at 208.
184. Ibid.
185. In re Guardianship of Mickler, 152 So.2d 205, 209 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
186. Ibid. (Wigginton, J., dissenting).
187. 114 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
188. In re Straitz's Estate, 135 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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B. Suits Against Guardians
Any suit brought by a former ward against his guardian which is
based upon negligence, willful misconduct or omission must be brought
within one year from the date of the final discharge of the guardian; 89
an allegation of fraud or concealment might serve to suspend the run-
ning of the statute.'
A Florida statute'9 ' provides that no annual returns "previously
approved by order of the county judge upon notice shall be subject to
objection." Conversely, an order of the county judge made without notice
to the ward is subject to collateral attack by him. Although the county
judge's court has the power to require the guardian to pay to the ward
any amounts found to be due from the guardian, the court does iot have
the power to enter a money judgment against the guardian. Nor does
the court have the power to establish a resulting trust in property which
was purchased by the guardian with the funds of the ward; this power
belongs exclusively to a court of equity.
92
C. Fees and Costs
It is erroneous for the county judge to confine the payment of fees
for an attorney who has rendered services to an estate to a particular
fund or property of the estate; the attorney is entitled to compensation
out of any property of the estate which may be available.'9 A fee of
$1,000 to a guardian ad litem for routine services (which allegedly took
only four hours time) in investigating and consenting to the sale of real
and personal property worth $54,500 has been held "grossly excessive."' 94
Also, the court ordered that the heirs of the estate (which was to pay the
guardians' fees) would-have to be given notice pursuant to the statute.9 5
The statute' 96 which provides that the fees of the county judge
shall be $7.50 for each case in which it is sought to have a person ad-
judicated physically or mentally incompetent is exclusive; the county
judge may not charge additional fees for the issuance, filing, docketing
and recording of the instruments necessary to a complete adjudication
of the proceedings. 97
D. Setting Aside Conveyances
The report of Saks v. Smith'98 is not entirely clear because the court
confused the use of the words "prior" and "subsequent." The case in-
189. FLA. STAT. § 746.14 (1961).
190. Beck v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 142 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
191. FLA. STAT. § 745.26(1) (1961).
192. In re Guardianship of White, -140 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
193. Ibid.
194. In re Hollenbeck's Estate, 137 So.2d 854, 856 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
195. FA. STAT. § 734.01(2) (1961).
196. FLA. STAT. § 394.23(1) (1961).
197. Howard v. Davis, 139 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
198. 145 So.2d.895 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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volved the allegation that a prior conveyance of property by an incom-
petent to her son was set aside at the suit of a third person who four
months later received property from this incompetent. It would appear
that the court held that this would not be a sufficient "allegation or proof
of the existence of fraud and duress or that the incompetent's mind was
impaired at the time of the"' 99 second conveyance. As a result, a cause
of action for declaratory relief was not stated.
Under Rule 1.8(g) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure200 it is
permissible to allege in one count that the grantor of a deed was in-
competent at the time of the conveyance and in the second count that
the deed was obtained by the grantee's exercise of undue influence upon
the grantor, even though the two allegations are inconsistent.
2 01
E. Curatorship
A will executed by a testatrix after a curator has been appointed is
not an "instrument in writing" under the Florida statute202 which pro-
vides that after the appointment of a curator, the ward shall be wholly
incapable of making "any instrument in writing, of legal force and effect"
unless notice is given to the curator and leave of court obtained. The
court refused to hold that section 731.04 of the Florida Statutes,
203 which
deals with the required testamentary qualifications, is limited by the
curator statute.0
F. Legislation
In an effort to clear up an ambiguity, section 518.01 of the Florida
Statutes2 5 was amended to provide specifically that guardians who re-
ceive funds from the Veterans Administration may invest them in savings
accounts and certificates of deposit in any bank chartered under the laws
of the United States or Florida. The original wording of section 518.01
had been limited to deposits in savings and loan associations.
It is unnecessary for any incompetent person to have a guardian
appointed in order to receive welfare payments, provided that the in-
competent is living in the household with an adult member of his
family.20°
Section 659.29 of the Florida Statutes has been amended 207 to pro-
vide that in the case of bank and trust company deposits made in the
199. Id. at 896.
200. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(g).
201. Mather-Smith v. Fairchild, 135 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
202. FLA. STAT. § 747.11 (1961).
203. FLA. STAT. § 731.04 (1961).
204. Skelton v. Davis, 133 So.2d 432 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
205. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-111, amending FLA. STAT. § 518.01 (1961).
206. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-353, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 409 (1961).
207. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-472, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.29 (1961).
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name of two or more persons, payable to either, the depositary may pay
the account to either of these persons or to the guardian of the property
of one of the depositors who is incompetent "whether the other or others
be living or not and whether the other or others be competent or not."
The wrongful death of minors provisions of the Florida Statutes
have been amended 8 to provide that the right of action "shall extend
to and include actions ex contractu and ex delicto." This amendment
should remove any obstacle to the assertion of a cause of action for
wrongful death caused by a breach of warranty.
XIII. ADOPTION
A. Jurisdiction and Procedure
When a court has retained jurisdiction to amend those provisions of
a final decree which deal with child custody, this jurisdiction may not be
ousted by the commencement of adoption proceedings in another county
by grandparents who were not made parties to the custody action. In
effect, both actions may be continued although it would appear foolish
to do so because the adoption decree (if favorable to the adopters)
would seemingly change the custody of the children. °9 There ought to
be a better way of handling this question of "conflicting" jurisdictions.
In accordance with the provisions of section 72.18 of the Florida
Statutes,210 it is error to enter a final decree in an adoption proceeding
without conducting a hearing subsequent to the filing of the report and
recommendations of the State Welfare Board, when the natural parents
have filed a formal opposition to the adoption. This principle prevails
even when the natural parents retain custody of the children and the
petition for adoption is denied.2 11
When a father's lack of interest in his child's welfare closely ap-
proaches the point of abandonment and his conduct when visiting the
child in the home of his former wife and her new husband "was such as
to justify a forfeiture of the parental rights accorded him under law,''21
this will justify a decree of adoption granted to the mother and her new
husband when these factors coincide with the best interests of the child.
B. Rights of Inheritance
The district courts of appeal have decided three cases of first im-
pression dealing with the inheritance rights of adopted children. In the
208. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-469, amending FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1961).
209. Moses v. Moses, 141 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
210. FLA. STAT. § 72.18 (1961).
211. McMillan v. Findley, 135 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
212. In re Adoption of Corcuera, 145 So.2d 493, 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). Compare
Meyers v. Shifrin, 146 So.2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), wherein the facts failed to show an
abandonment by the father. See Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a
Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962).
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first case 1' it was held that when a will leaves property to the "then
living descendants" of a person who adopts a child after the death of the
testator, the adopted child shall be considered as a descendant (pursuant
to the statute) 214 of the adopting parent. The adopted child does not
take as an heir or descendant of the testator, but rather as a descendant
of the adopting parent. In the second case2 15 it was decided that the
Florida statute216 which provides that an adopted child may inherit from
the natural children of the adopting parents does not impliedly revoke
the adopted child's rights of inheritance from his natural brothers, sisters
and blood kindred. In the third case 217 it was ruled that an adult who
was adopted in Greece by a single person who had never been married
could not be an heir of the adopter under the Pretermitted Heir Stat-
ute. 1  The Florida statute219 providing that a "married couple, or the
survivor thereof" may adopt an adult implies that an adoption by an
adult who has never been married "is repugnant to the laws and policy
of this state. '22° Although the status of the adoptee may be governed by
the laws of Greece, the incidents of the adoption with regard to inherit-
ance are governed by the laws of Florida. The holding of this case would
seem to have been destroyed by an amendment to this statute which is
discussed in the following section.
C. Legislation
Under an amendment to section 72.34 of the Florida Statutes, any
married or unmarried adult may petition for the adoption of another
adult whether married or single provided that the adopter (or adopters)
are more than ten years older than the adoptee. 2 '
Section 72.13 of the adoption law has been amended by deleting the
words "and legal disabilities, if any" so that now the affidavit for con-
structive service must merely state that diligent search has been made
to ascertain the names and residence of the natural parents or the legal
guardian.222
XIV. JUVENILES AND JUVENILE COURTS
A. Juvenile Courts
If a child custody case is transferred from the juvenile court of one
county to the juvenile court of another, the latter county has exclusive
213. First Nat'l Bank v. Bobcik, 132 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
214. FLA. STAT. § 731.30 (1961).
215. In re Levy's Estate, 141 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
2,16. FLA. STAT. § 731.30 (1961).
217. Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961). See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d
1240 (1963).
218. FLA. STAT. § 731.11 (1961).
219. FLA. STAT. § 72.38 (1961).
220. Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
221. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-273, amending FLA. STAT. § 72.34 (1961).
222. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-211, amending FLA. STAT. § 72.13 (1961).
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jurisdiction and has the power to utilize contempt proceedings for a
failure to comply with a custody order entered by the original court prior
to its transferring the case.223
The second district has decided that the special act 224 creating the
Broward County Juvenile Court does not authorize the circuit court to
transfer jurisdiction over child custody matters to this juvenile court
in the absence of any question that the children are dependent or delin-
quent or both. As dicta, the court stated that if it were to hold to the
contrary, it would be required to hold the act unconstitutional under
prior decisions.225
When an appellant subsequent to an appeal files.a motion to re-
mand jurisdiction to the juvenile court because allegedly false testimony
was introduced before the court, the motion to remand may be treated
as a request for leave to file a petition in the nature of a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis. As a consequence, the appellate court will stay
the appellate proceedings pending further proceedings before the juvenile
court.
226
The Florida Attorney General has ruled that pursuant to section
39.12(2) of the Florida Statutes227 the records of the juvenile court, with
the exception of those which permanently sever the custody of children
from their parents, may be destroyed after a period of ten years subject
to the approval of the Records Screening Board.228
B. Legislation
The jurisdictional provisions of the juvenile court act were amended
to provide that if any juvenile is brought into the juvenile court for com-
mitting an act which would constitute a violation of federal law, state
law or city ordinances in the operation of a motor vehicle if he were an
adult, the judge may waive jurisdiction and certify the case to the court
which would have jurisdiction if the child were an adult.229
Every physician (including medical doctors and licensed osteo-
paths) is now required to make a written report to the juvenile judge
whenever a child under the age of sixteen years is examined or treated
for injuries, other than accidental, inflicted upon the child by a parent
or caretaker. The doctor is immune from liability in making the report
and participating in a judicial hearing unless he "acted in bad faith or
223. Graham v. State, 144 So.2d 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
224. Laws of Fla., ch. 22709, Special Acts of 1945, § 15.
225. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 138 So.2d 83 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
226. Chambers v. Chambers, 143 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). For an interesting
article on the subject of delinquency, see Fox, Delinquency and Biology, 16 U. MIAmi L. REV.
65 (1961).
227. FLA. STAT. § 39.12(2) (1961).
228. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 062-56 (April 20, 1962).
229. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-12, amending FiA. STAT. § 39.02(1) (1961).
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with malicious purpose," and he is presumed to have acted in good faith.
Further, the physician-patient privilege shall not be a ground for ex-
cluding evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause of his injuries.
Any physician who knowingly and wilfully violates this law will be guilty
of a misdemeanor. 3 °
Section 295.02 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide for
scholarship benefits to children of deceased veterans on a quarter, se-
mester or trimester basis, and the sum of eight thousand dollars per year
was appropriated for this purpose."'
Section 450.061(1) was amended to provide that no one under the
age of sixteen (whether his disabilities of nonage have been removed by
marriage or otherwise) shall be permitted to engage in the manufacture,
transportation or use of radioactive materials. 2
C. Criminal Cases Involving Juveniles and Pertinent Legislation
Under section 39.02(6) of the Florida Statutes, 3 the juvenile court
has no authority to transfer jurisdiction over a non-felony case involving
a minor fourteen years of age or older to a municipal court without the
demand of the minor; only in felony cases may the juvenile court make
this transfer without the demand of the minor.23 4
Section 932.38 of the Florida Statutes2 5 requires that service of
notice must be made upon the parents or guardian of any minor before
he is tried for any offense. In the preceding two-year period, twenty-two
cases arose under this statute.216 During the period being surveyed at
least thirteen more cases arose. In a four-to-three opinion the Florida
Supreme Court apparently held that notice need not be given to a minor's
mother when the mother's brother had actual notice of the minor's pre-
dicament, came before the court and employed an attorney to represent
him. The rationale seemingly was that the minor's mother was a for-
mer inmate at a state mental hospital, she now resided with her
brother, and she had contributed little to the upbringing of her son.23 7
On the other hand, the court refused to order a hearing to determine
whether a minor's grandfather or aunt had actual knowledge of the
charges brought, because even if these parties had had actual knowledge
it would not have excused the lack of notice to the minor's parents.
Further, the court refused to order a hearing to determine if the minor
had entered into a common law marriage which would obviate the neces-
230. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-24. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 396 (1963).
231. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-124, amending FLA. STAT. § 295.02 (1961).
232. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-82, amending FLA. STAT. § 450.061(1) (1961).
233. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1961).
234. In re C.A.P., 155 So.2d 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
235. FIA. STAT. § 932.38 (1961).
236. Murray, Family Law, 16 U. Mi ma L. REV. 177, 204-6 (1961).
237. Davis v. Cochran, 132 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1961).
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sity for notice to the parents. The refusal was based upon the complexity
of the question of marital status along with the fact that a determination
of the question would have far reaching implications as to the marital
rights and obligations of the petitioner and might also be construed to
fix such status, rights and obligations of the girl involved, who would not
be a party to the proceedings.
238
In a case of first impression, the Florida Supreme Court held that
notice must be given to the parents of a minor before he is tried for an
offense even though he was a member of the Armed Forces at the time
of the commission of the crime. The emancipation of the minor by virtue
of his military service does not remove him from the express provisions
of the statute requiring notice.23 9
It would appear that unless the state alleges and proves that an
alleged minor lied about his age and that the trial court relied upon this
lie in the belief that the minor was over twenty-one years of age, a
criminal conviction is void because of a failure to give notice to his
parents.240 The statute requires that notice be given for each charge;
therefore, even though the parents were informed of two charges the
court could not convict the minor for two additional charges even though
all four charges were tried on the same day.24' If a minor's parents have
actual notice of his predicament and have discussed the possibility of
probation with the trial judge, the requirements of the statute have been
satisfied.2 42 The statutory notice is required even when the minor is
being tried for the offense of unlawful escape from the state prison.243
The statute is not complied with when the written notice to the parents
is returned with the notation by the postal authorities "Returned Un-
known. 244
The revocation of a minor's probation by a court in one county
solely because the minor was convicted of a crime in another county is
erroneous when the conviction was invalid because of a failure to give
the required notice to the minor's parents. However, this holding would
seem to be an empty one because the court noted that the probation
county's court could make its own independent examination of the mi-
nor's conduct in the convicting county to ascertain if he had violated the
conditions of his probation,243 which the trial court did upon remand. 46
238. Patrick v. Cochran, 134 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1961).
239. Dora v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1962).
240. Vellucci v. Cochran, 138 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1962), following Willis v. Cochran, 131
So. 728 (Fla. 1961).
241. Keene v. Cochran, 146 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1962).
242. Craig v. Cochran, 132 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1961).
243. Morgan v. Cochran, 142 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1962); Champion v. Cochran, 133 So.2d
68 (Fla. 1961).
244. Collins v. Wainwright, 156 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1962). The unclear decision in Habich v.
Cochran, 148 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1962), may be in accord.
245. State ex rel. Roberts v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1962).
246. Roberts v. State, 154 So.2d 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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Inasmuch as the failure to give notice to a minor's parents renders
a conviction void, it is proper for the judge to set aside the conviction
upon his own motion, grant a new trial and then impose a seven-year sen-
tence even though the same judge imposed only a one-year sentence at the
first trial. There would not be double jeopardy because the prior pro-
ceedings, being null and void, would not place the accused in jeopardy. 47
XV. ILLEGITIMACY
In a case of first impression it has been held that a summary judg-
ment should not be entered in favor of a man accused of bastardy who
presents medical proof of his sterility as the result of a vasectomy, when
this proof is opposed by testimony of the woman that the defendant was
the sole person who had intercourse with her during the period of con-
ception and that a child was born as a result of this intercourse. It should
be noted that there was some question as to whether the vasectomy was
performed prior to or subsequent to the alleged intercourse. 4 ' It would
perhaps appear from this decision that no matter how overwhelming the
weight of medical testimony in proof of sterility, testimony by the woman
will be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact precluding the entry
of a summary judgment. In still another case of first impression it was
decided that an appellate court may, within its discretion, dismiss an
appeal by the father of an illegitimate child when he is in contempt of
the trial court for his failure to pay the sums of money decreed by the
court. The dismissal of the appeal may be conditioned upon the appel-
lant's purging himself of contempt or by the fact that he had been taken
into custody by the sheriff.24
The Florida courts have jurisdiction in bastardy actions even though
the illegitimate child happens to be a resident of a foreign country. Fur-
ther, the court may issue a writ of ne exeat to prevent the putative father
from leaving the state.250
One of the pitfalls in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Law"5 ' was demonstrated in Clarke v. Blackburn 5.25  The governor
of Florida issued an extradition warrant in response to the demand of
the governor of North Carolina. The demand stated that Clarke's extra-
dition was requested for trial of the crime of non-support of an illegit-
imate child. The demand charged Clarke with fathering the child, but it
failed to allege that he was present in North Carolina during the period
of the non-support with which he was charged. Therefore, the Florida
247. Michell v. State, 154 So.2d 701 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). The cases of Branson v.
Cochran, 138 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1962) and McEwen v. Wainwright, 147 So.2d 317 (Fla.
1962) merely held that the required notice had been given.
248. Crepaldi v. Wagner, 132 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
249. Morris v. Rabara, 145 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
250. De Moya v. De Pena, 148 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
251. FLA. STAT. ch. 88 (1961).
252. 151 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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court held that under section 88.081 of Florida Statutes2 5 the duties of
support are those imposed by the state where the obligor (Clarke) was
present during the period of non-support, which in this case was Florida.
The Florida law dealing with bastardy provides that there is no duty to
support an illegitimate child until there has been a judicial determination
by a court of chancery. Since North Carolina law did not apply and since
no judicial determination had been made in Florida that Clarke was under
a duty to support his putative child, he was released from custody upon a
writ of habeas corpus.
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Change of Name of a Child
It is an abuse of discretion for a chancellor to deny a father's re-
quest for a postponement of hearing when he was given only six days
notice in New York that the child's mother was seeking to have the
child's name changed in Florida."
B. "Confidential Relationship of a Mistress"
When a husband and father (who is considerably older than his
mistress) substitutes the mistress' name in place of his wife as the bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy, a presumption of over-reaching or un-
due influence arises which may justify avoidance of the transaction in
the absence of positive evidence of good faith and fair dealing. The pre-
sumption of overreaching arises because of "a confidential relationship
or a quasi confidential relationship through meretricious association,"'25
and the mistress has the burden of overcoming the presumption of undue
influence.
C. Divorce and Wills
In a case of apparent first impression, it has been decided that the
Florida statute2 6 which provides that all provisions in a will in favor of
a wife are rendered void when the parties are divorced is applicable even
when the parties were never legally married. The testator executed the
will when the parties were living as man and wife, although they went
through a civil marriage approximately one year later. Subsequently, the
wife divorced the husband, but later it was disclosed that the husband
253. FLA. STAT. § 88.081 (1961).
254. Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962):
To change the name of a minor son so that he no longer bears his father's name
is a serious matter, and such action may be taken only where the record affirma-
tively shows that such change is required for the welfare of the minor. Society has
a strong interest in the preservation of the parental relationship . . .and a pos-
sible adverse effect on the relationship between a father and child is a valid ground
for refusing to change the name of a 12-year-old child. At this tender age a child
is not capable of making an intelligent choice in the matter of his name.
255. Benner v. Pederson, 143 So.2d 722, 726 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
256. FLA. STAT. § 731.101 (1961).
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had a prior undivorced spouse. The court held that although the claimant
"wife" was never the legal wife of the deceased testator, it would be
contrary to the purpose and intent of the legislature to allow her to re-
cover. 
2 57
257. Conascenta v. Giordano, 143 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
